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LA REVUE DU BARREAU CANADIEN [Vol . 61
realistic therefore to regard the definition as exhaustive" .' The reviewer
not only totally disagrees with this statement as it applies to the Supreme
Court, but also takes the view that by virtue of the entrenchment of the
office ofthe Queen, the Governor General and the Lieutenant Governor of
a province, by section 41(a), a substantial number of other matters are
entrenched that are not listed in the schedule to the Constitution Act,
1982 .'0
The above comments, however, are not meant to derogate from my
appreciation of this very excellent work produced so quickly and effective-
ly by the author . It contains a wealth of valuable information and insights
for any lawyer invoking the provisions of the Constitution Act, 1982 . It is
strongly recommended for anyone involved in the teaching or the practice
of Canadian constitutional law.
RONALD I . CHEFFINS*
Legal Rights in the Canadian Charter- ofRights andFreedoms :A Manual
ofIssues and Sources . By The Honourable DAVID C . MCDONALD .
Toronto: Carswell Co . Ltd. 1982 . Pp . xxv, 275 . ($25 .00)
The problem of the legitimacy of judicial review of a democratic polity,
long an obsession ofAmerican constitutional scholars,' has never seriously
stirred the imagination or the energies of Canada's legal community.2
Justice David C. McDonald's Legal Rights in the Canadian Charter of
Rights andFreedoms, while hinting at the relevance and richness of the
American debate, remains firmly within the Canadian tradition . Rather
than attempting the Herculean task of constructing a "theory of moral
9 P. 105.
to The reviewer has detailed his argument more fully in an article which will shortly be
published in (1982), 4 Supreme Court L. Rev.
Ronald I. Cheffins, of the Faculty of Law, University of Victoria, Victoria, B.C .
' This preoccupation, far from abating, seems to be actually gaining momentum . See,
for example, J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980) ; J. Choper, Judicial Review and the
National Political Process (1980) ; L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (1978) .
z There have, of course, been exceptions to this rule: see P . Weiler, In the Last Resort
(1974) ; M. Gold, Equality Before the Law in the Supreme Court of Canada (1980), 18




rights against the state",3 Justice McDonald undertakes to discuss in
general terms the difficulties which may arise in the judicial interpretation
of the newly enacted Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms .' The
author focuses upon the "legal rights" sections ofthe Charter (sections 7 to
14) as well as the limiting clause (section 1) and the enforcement clause
(section 24).
This book will no doubt be useful to the Canadian judge or lawyer
looking for an introductory work that highlights possible issues arising
under the Charter and suggests avenues of further inquiry. Relying on
judicial decisions under the Canadian Bill of Rights, the United States Bill
of Rights and the various International Conventions and Declarations on
HumanRights, Justice McDonald sets out the differing interpretations that
may be advanced under the Charter and points to arguments that could be
marshalled in favour of these various interpretations. The latter third ofthe
book comprises a series of appendices. These appendices reproduce the
Charter, the American and Canadian Bills of Rights, the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the European Convention onHumanRights . The final appendix
contains a selection ofjudicial and extra-judicial writings on the interpreta-
tion of the American Constitution . While this final body of material would
be helpful to a lawyer with little or no previous exposure to American
constitutional writing, it omits reference to the leading recent works in the
field such as the books by John Hart Ely5 and Lawrence Tribe. 6
While this book may serve as a helpful starting point for discussion
of the Charter's legal rights, one might have hoped for more . Justice
McDonald makes a concerted effort to point to possible issues that
may arise under the Charter without suggesting which interpretation is
more compelling or persuasive . At times, this leaves the reader with the
sense that the material is somewhat undigested . For example, in discussing
the Charter requirement that an accused receive a hearing before an
"independent and impartial tribunal"7 the author cites the recent Supreme
3 See Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977), p. 149, who argues that legal theory
must be both normative as well as conceptual and that the normative theory "will be
embeddedin a more general political and moral philosophy which may in turn depend upon
philosophical theories about human nature or the objectivity of morality". Ibid ., p. viii .
Ironically, Justice McDonald opens his book with quotations from Dworkin and John
Rawls, but he makes no attempt in his substantive discussion ofthe Charter to respond to
their call for a fusion of constitutional law and moral theory . For some, this may be one of
the book's strengths.
a The Charter is Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 . The Constitution Act, 1982 was
enacted as Schedule B of the Canada Act, . 1982, c. 11 (U.K .) .
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Court decision in McKayv . The Queen, s a case decided under the "fair and
public hearing" requirement of the Canadian Bill of Rights .' Yet rather
than offer an analysis of the case and of its relevance for the Charter, the
author simply reproduces long extracts from the three judgments in McKay
and moves on to discuss another question . This cautious technique is
premised on the author's belief that "at this early stage it would be
foolhardy to predict what Canadian judges will do, and it would be
presumptuous for oneof them to appear to be suggesting to others what the
correct interpretation should be" .'°
Further, one would have hoped for some analysis relating the Amer-
ican literature reproduced in the appendix to the Charter provisions . This
material would appear to be particularly relevant in terms of section 1 of the
Charter, which provides that rights are subject to "such reasonable limits
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free anddemocratic
society" . This section apparently invites judges to venture forth into the
uncharted and dangerous waters of political and social theory . The judge
will only be able to apply section 1 after he or she has constructed some
background theory of the nature and requirements of the democratic
polity."I Justice McDonald suggests a possible avenue of escape from this
politicizedjudicial role . He argues that the courts should first identify other
societies that are "free and democratic", those in which "as a matter of
common knowledge, freedoms and democratic rights similar to those in
section 2 and 5 are enjoyed" . 12 The court wouldthen ascertain what limits
these other societies impose on the exercise of fundamental freedoms and
8 (1981), 114 D.L.R . (3d) 393.
9 S . 2(f) states that federal laws are to be construed so as not to deprive an accused ofa
"fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal" . The McKay case also
raised a problem of the individual's right under s. 1(b) to equality before the law.
10 p. 5.
11 This is a highly controversial and difficult task since democracy is a "contested
concept" . See Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts (1965), 56 Procs. ofArist . Soc. 167 .
Professor Ely, op . cit., footnote 1, argues that judges can avoid questions of substantive
political values by resorting to a "process-based" theory ofdemocracy. Ronald Dworkin,
among others, has argued that even this approach is covertly value-laden . Dworkin suggests
that the abstract ideal of democracy cannot answer the question ofwhat rights people have :
. . . [Juudges charged with identifying and protecting the best conception ofdemocracy
cannot avoid making . . . decisions about individual substantive rights . Judges may, of
course, believe that the utilitarian answer to the question of individual rights is the correct
one-that people have no rights . But that is a substantive decision of political morality .
And, otherjudges will disagree . If they do, then the suggestion that they must defend the
best conception ofdemocracy will not free them from having to consider what rights people
have." The Forum ofPrinciple (1981), 56 N. Y.U.L.Rev. 469, atp. 510. The difficulty, of
course, is whether it is possible to construct a theory of fundamental rights that is neither
hopelessly vague nor blatantly "political" in nature . See Ely, op . cit., ibid., pp . 43-72 and
Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative
Constitutional Scholarship (1981), 90 Yale L.J . 1063 .




interpret the Canadian Charter accordingly. Yet this methodology could
only succeed if we knew in advance the limitations on freedom that were
consonant with a "free and democratic society" . Without such an over-
arching theory, the attempt to identify a set of free and democratic societies
would be circular and futile .
Judicial review under the Charter will be unsettling and uncertain,
requiring. a synthesis of political and legal theory . This book is helpful in
identifying some of the questions and problems that will arise in that
enterprise, but the reader will have to look elsewhere for more profound or
penetrating insights as to the form that the anwers to those questions might
take .
PATRICK MONAHAN*
Discrimination and the Law in Canada. By WALTER S . TARNOPOLSKY,
Q.C . Don Mills, Ontario: Richard De Boo Limited . 1982 . Pp . 595.
($65 .00)
Professor Tarnopolsky has done it again. Following his classic work on The
Canadian Rill of Rights' he has. produced a lucid, comprehensive and
thoughtful exposition of the law related to discrimination in Canada . The
Canadian Rill ofRights has established itself as an invaluable reference
work which has been cited frequently in judicial decisions and legal
articles . Discrimination and theLaw is bound to achieve similar success.
Thelaw and practice related to racial discrimination is far from being
an academic exercise . It is a significant area of legislative regulation of
conduct into which almost anylawyer in the country maybe thrust with the
entry of the next client into his or her office .
Thelawyer maybe confronted with questions such as the extent of the
employer's obligation to accommodate the religious practices ofaSeventh
Day Adventist who will not work on Saturdays. Can a Sikh taxi driver
lawfully be dismissed for refusing to abandon his turban in favour of the .
peak cap worn by all other drivers of the company in question? What if it is
a safety helmet that the Sikh worker is required to wear as a safety measure?
Atwhat point do "jokes " with sexual connotations between supervisor and
employee constitute sexual "harassment"?The consequences of a finding
of discrimination canbe significant whether through settlement negotiated
by a Human Rights Commission or through the order of aboard of inquiry
which has conducted a formal hearing and concluded that unlawful dis-
* Patrick Monahan, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto .
1 (2nd rev . ed ., 1975)
